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ABSTRACT
The United States is currently in a strong position economically
and politically which enables the Reagan Administration to implement its
new economic policy towards Latin America. Together with the debt
crisis, this policy, determined by U.S. geopolitical interests and a
strong belief in the advantages o-f a free-market economy, has forced
Latin American countries into a painful adjustment process. They cannot
look any longer for external solutions to their problems but must
instead carry out long delayed internal reforms. The situation is both
a challenge and an opportunity for new democratic leaders.

Peter Richter*
A New Dependency? Outcome of the Reagan Administration's
Economic Policy toward Latin America
The 1970s have often been characterized as a period of growing
interdependence and power diversity in interamerican relations, thereby
"ending the hegemonic presumption" of the United States. Such views
have been combined with the expectation that greater self-determination
and more diversified international relations would foster the social
and economic development of Latin America. Reasons given for the de-
cline of the United States as a hegemonic power were internal problems
(Vietnam-syndrome, Watergate, economic stagnation), the emerging influ-
ence of other powers in the Western Hemisphere (Japan, West-Germany, .
Soviet-Union) and a growing global importance of some Latin American
nations (Brazil, Mexico, Cuba). Nowadays former President Carter's
policy is often seen as a weakening factor itself. But assuming the
trends above have been analyzed correctly, his policy should rather be
judged as a realistic attempt to cope with a changed international
environment. The Carter administration accepted an ideological plural-
ism in the Hemisphere and defined U.S. policy toward Latin America as
part of its overall approach to the developing world, including concerns
2
about human rights in this part of the world.
Yet this approach did not survive long. President Reagan quickly
made it clear that one of his prime goals is to reassert U.S. influence
*This paper was completed when the author was a visiting scholar at
the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign. The author would like
to thank Werner Baer, Larry Neal and Robert Scott for their valuable
contributions.
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in the Western Hemisphere. The background to this effort is the Reagan
Administration's preoccupation with the global balance vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. "On the basis that the United States' global posture
will suffer greatly if it does not control political developments in
the immediate vicinity considered hostile to national interests, the
re-establishment of U.S. influence in Latin America has become a high
3priority." That means the new policy follows in the first place U.S.
geopolitical and security interests and neglects to a great extent the
social and economic needs of the region. A secondary, but in its
impact on the well-being of the region just as decisive, factor deter-
mining the new U.S. policy is the economic ideology of the Reagan
Administration ("miracle of the market-place").
The consequences of this approach for the development prospects of
Latin American countries can only be fully understood by taking into
account the present international environment and especially those fac-
tors determining the power balance in the Americas:
The North-South-dialogue has run out of steam.
The Latin American countries are struggling with a deep structural
crisis (which takes different forms in the various countries).
Due to their large foreign debts they are extremely vulnerable.
The European partners are very much concerned with their own economic
problems
.
A new Latin American solidarity is not in sight.
- The U.S. economy has regained strength; the U.S. currency is again
dominating the international financial markets.
-3-
These circumstances suggest that the dependence of Latin American
countries on the predominant partner in the North is again growing,
thereby reversing—at least partially— the trend of the 1970s. As
Reagan's approach to Latin America is very much influenced by security
concerns, most studies focus on political issues. The intention of
this paper is to analyze the Reagan Administration's foreign economic
policy and its influence on the economic relations between the United
States and Latin America in order to get a more substantial picture of
the new dependency of Latin American countries.
Reaganomics and Foreign Economic Policy
One has to understand first that under the Reagan Administration
the concern for international economic matters has been subordinated to
domestic economic interests to a much higher degree than in former
administrations. The new Administration's preeminent goal has been and
still is to create the necessary conditions for a strong growth per-
formance of the U.S. economy without rekindling inflation. "An
improved domestic economy was seen as both the key to the Admini-
stration's political fortune and the necessary underpinning for the
4
resurgence of American military and diplomatic strength abroad."
When President Reagan came into office in 1981 the U.S. economy was
in big trouble. The situation can best be described by referring to
the term "stagflation." The GNP was stagnating while inflation was
soaring and interest rates were sky-rocketing. The President's and
his advisers' diagnosis was basically that the government in the past
decade had gained too much influence in the economy so that private
-4-
initiative, seen as crucial to economic development, had been severely
hampered. The cure consisted in a rather unique mixture of economic
steps derived from the thinking of "supply side" economists (reductions
in personal and business taxes, cuts in social welfare programs, regu-
latory relief) and of monetarists (stable and restrictive monetary
policy). Although not undertaken for economic reasons, the large military
build-up is usually considered another fundamental element of the so-
called "Reaganomics" because of its enormous economic implications.
The same ideas and convictions can be found again in the Administra-
tion's attitude to international economic matters. Its basic belief is
that if each government were practicing sound economic policies, the
need for interventions on an international scale would be minimal. The
international exchange of goods, services and capital would be func-
tioning for the best of all nations, if governments restricted them-
selves permanently from intervening. Just as the role of national
government in the eyes of the Reagan Administration should be minimized,
so should the international action of governments and of multinational
institutions. "The Administration has (therefore) sought to promote
an open international environment where economic decisions respond to
market signals, and where U.S. finns could prosper. (Besides) the
Administration has sought to implement its free-market principles in
..6
various bilateral and multilateral institutions.
The developing countries are being looked at basically in the same
way, especially when they are more advanced as are many Latin American
countries. Most of today's economic problems in the Third World are
traced back to excessive governmental Interventionist) , to ideological
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inclinations and the resulting distortion of internal prices and re-
source allocation. As the present stagnation and impoverishment of
many developing countries seem to be caused by mistaken internal policies,
self-efforts of those countries and their governments are, in the
Administration's opinion, crucial in a process aimed to overcome back-
wardness and underdevelopment. They should follow the U.S. example,
and devote itself to policies like liberalization, deregulation and
opening-up the economy. An important role in this new concept is
played by the promotion of a deeper integration of developing countries
into the world economy. The Administration points in particular to the
success of various countries in South East Asia with export-led strate-
gies.
The importance of foreign aid is played down by the Reagan Admini-
stration. Revenues stemming from exports, direct investments and pri-
vate bank lending are today in most developing countries much higher
than foreign assistance payments. Therefore, a healthy, strong and open
U.S. economy would be the best contribution to the welfare of developing
countries. Those arguments were used by the Reagan Administration to
justify the rejection of all claims for an increase in foreign
assistance. Besides, a quite radical realignment of the development
aid concept was planned. First, U.S. contributions to multinational
institutions should be diminished in favor of bilateral assignments
whose use can be monitored directly. Second, instead of feeding
further governmental funds, whose effectiveness is doubted, foreign
assistance should be used to help the widely neglected private sector.
-6-
How this concept influenced the actual U.S. policy towards Latin
America will be presented below. At this point some general remarks
have to be made to set the new development policy of the Reagan
Administration into perspective. First, the whole approach doesn't
show much understanding about the real problems of Third World
countries. Most of them have not yet developed a socio-economic struc-
ture comparable to that of industrialized or developed countries. It
is thus not reasonable, at least for most developing countries, to
adopt a model that is used on a different stage of development. To
name only a few of the structural defects which are typically found in
developing economies:
lack of technological, entrepreneurial and administrative know-how,
lack of investment capital,
backwardness of the non-export orientated agricultural sector,
high concentration of firms in most modern branches,
- a low commitment of national entrepreneurs to export and inter-
national competition.
The neo-liberal model that operates on a macro-economic level is not
suited to deal with these and other structural defects.
What happens when such a model is applied to an inadequate environ-
ment can be studied in the cases of Chile and Uruguay (1973-1981) and
g
Argentina (1976-1982) extensively. The then ruling military govern-
ments, envisioning a complete restructuring of the economy, tried
vigorously to stimulate private initiative in their respective countries
by curbing the economic role of the state sector, by opening-up the
economy to foreign competition and by attracting foreign capital.
-7-
After an initial boom phase caused rather by financial speculation and
marketing of foreign goods than by a build-up of productive units the
economies slowed down dramatically in 1981 and 1982. The heavy influx
of foreign goods had hurt many industries badly. At the same time the
flow of foreign money to the Southern Cone countries slowed down
because the level of accumulated debts was considered increasingly
risky. Consequently, all three countries became insolvent and had to
approach the IMF for stand-by help. The monetarist experiment of the
Southern Cone countries is today evaluated broadly as a complete failure.
Secondly, with Reagan in office the on-going North-South dialogue
came to a complete standstill. The attendance of President Reagan at
the Cancun summit, which was a surprise and gave room for hopes, has to
be judged in retrospect as above all a diplomatic step in order to pre-
sent the position of the new Administration and to avoid being iso-
lated. In short, the presented position was that the U.S. would only
take part in "global negotiations" if these would occur within the spe-
cialized agencies and the principle of weighted voting within these
9
agencies was not challenged. Of course, the question arises if such
negotiations would still mean the same as the North-South dialogue was
supposed to be: a bargaining process between equal partners taking
the full spectrum of international economic relations into account.
Anyhow, Reagan did not make any concrete commitment and consensus was
not even reached about where and how to begin "global negotiations."
Admittedly, the North-South dialogue never proceeded really smoothly;
every concession on the part of the industrialized countries had been
obtained only after a fierce struggle; and there was a lot of criticism
about the bureaucratic organization of this dialogue (UNCTAD, UNIDO,
-8-
etc). But still, many imbalances exist in the economic relations
between developing and developed countries stemming from different
endowments of technology, human skills and capital. Most international
institutions reflect those imbalances by being dominated by the indus-
trialized countries. If a deeper integration of the developing countries
into the world economy is actually wanted, as well as a sustained growth
in the Third World, some modifications of the international economic
order are unavoidable. But at the present time, no move by the
U.S.— the biggest economic power in the world—is being undertaken to
revive the dialogue in any way whatsoever.
Thirdly, and this is what hurts the developing countries most: The
Reagan Administration shows little concern about the foreign implica-
tions of its economic program. As many predicted, the unique mix of
tax cuts and increased military spending, the core of Reaganomics,
resulted in a sharp widening of the fiscal deficit and a remarkable
increase in the governmental quest for financial resources. As the
third element of Reaganomics has been a tight monetary policy, interest
rates necessarily went up. In a world of closely integrated capital
markets the result was a world-wide upsurge of interest rates causing a
deep international recession which is still ongoing. In 1983 and 1984
the U.S. economy showed a strong recovery, but is still dependent upon
a heavy influx of foreign money to finance the still rising fiscal
and balance of trade deficit.
The developing countries suffered most from high interest rates
and the resulting international recession. By the end of 1983,
the external debt of developing countries owed to private sources
-9-
amounted to roughly $400 billion (excluding short term loans). This
means every one percent increase of the interest rates due to the
widening U.S. fiscal deficit deteriorated the balance of payments of
7
developing countries by around $4 billion. But that's not the whole
story. Because of rising problems on the part of the developing
countries in meeting their financial commitments, private banks vir-
tually stopped lending money—on a voluntary basis—to the highly
indebted ranked countries, further worsening their financial situation.
Most had to approach the IMF for help and are currently undergoing a
painful process of adjustment.
There are several other effects produced by the U.S. economic
policy and the world recession that threaten the well-being of the
developing countries:
High U.S. interest rates further enhance capital flight.
- Investors from the United States and other developed countries
prefer the high-return, low-risk financial Investments available
at home to risky direct investments in developing countries.
With growth in the industrial countries slowing down, the prices of
primary commodities, which still constitute the bigger part of the
exports of developing countries, slumped dramatically.
Trade Policy and Trade Relations
The Reagan Administration sees free international trade of goods
and services as beneficial for all participating countries. Especially
for the developing countries with their relatively small internal
markets international trade is considered an engine of growth. The
-10-
fact that three-quarters of their foreign trade takes place with in-
dustrialized countries explains the Administration's accentuation of
the crucial importance of high growth rates in OECD countries for the
well-being of the Third World. Nevertheless, this conviction never
resulted in a radical initiative to remove all existing barriers to
trade.
In the late 70s barriers to exports of developing countries had
been reduced quite substantially through the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), which allowed many manufactured and agricultural
products to enter the U.S. market duty free, and as a result of agree-
ments reached during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
which provided tariff reductions plus several new codes of conduct.
Yet this policy never applied to the whole range of developing
countries exports. Product lines in which developing countries are
predominant, such as textiles and apparel, footwear, etc., still face
substantial trade barriers. These barriers can either take the form of
extraordinarily high tariffs or of orderly marketing quotas.
The Administration's attitude toward pressures coming from enter-
prises and trade unions to impose new restrictions on the access of
products from developing countries to the U.S. market is quite ambiva-
lent. Those pressures resulted from growing foreign competition during
the recent boom of the U.S. economy, which produced high interest rates
and a rising value of the Dollar. One agreement on shoe imports was
not renewed by the Reagan Administration and expired in 1981. Against
that, the Administration consented to a renewal of the important multifibre
-11-
arrangement (MFA), which restricts the rate of textile imports to the
rate of domestic market growth. Another arrangement, which was reached
in 1984, restricts steel imports. Among the countries hit by this
arrangement is Brazil.
The global approach to trade policy was left, when the Reagan
Administration announced in 1982 its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
which is a perfect example of the close linkage between security
interests and foreign economic policy. Principal elements of the CBI
program are a Free Trade Area (FTA) and increased economic and military
aid. The program was quickly labeled as the most important U.S. ini-
tiative in the Western Hemisphere since the Alliance for Progress.
Background of the initiative is the deep concern about social unrest,
"imported terrorism" and economic instability in a neighboring
12
region. Consequently, the aim of CBI is to help the nations of
Central America and the Caribbean to cope with the economic crisis and
to fight the socio-economic roots of anti-U.S. and revolutionary move-
ments.
The centerpiece of the CBI is the Free Trade Area which provides one-
way, duty-free access to U.S. market for Caribbean Basin exports during
13
a 12 year period. But again, as in the case of GSP, the Free Trade
Area doesn't apply to all Caribbean Basin exports. Several products,
including petroleum, footwear, textiles and leather products are
exempted from duty-free treatment. Because of these exemptions and the
fact that 87 percent of the region's total export into the United States
already enters duty free, the short-term results are likely to be small.
Experts figured out that only about five percent of the region's total
-12-
exports will be affected. In money terms these five percent are equi-
14
valent to $450 million.
The amount of new trade generated for the CBI countries through FTA
treatment depends on two variables: (1) How many additional consumers
buy these products because prices fall, and (2) how many consumers
shift away from similar imported goods produced elsewhere. To predict
such changes is always hazardous. Economist Richard Feinberg estimates
the newly generated trade per year to lie somehow between $70 million
and $100 million, about 1 percent of the region's 1980 exports. In the
eyes of Feinberg "the real hopes for an eventual import surge lies in
products not currently produced in the region, and in the decision of
foreign-owned firms to locate new factories there." The potential
seen for new direct investments is based on competitive wages in the
Caribbean Basin and the geographic proximity to the U.S. market. One
study, cited by Feinberg, found that CBI countries would have a
distinct price advantage to gain U.S. markets equivalent to $2.5
billion in 1982. 16
This figure sounds quite impressive, but one has to take into
account that foreign investors base their decisions not only on market-
related data, but equally on the macro-economic performance of a country
and its political stability. In both areas the medium-term outlook for
the Caribbean Basin is not very good.
It is too early for a definitive appraisal of the CBI program.
What can be stated is that the CBI is not designed to help the
Caribbean and Central American countries to overcome their deep and long-
lasting socio-economic crisis. This would require a redistribution of
income, structural reforms in the agricultural and industrial sector
-13-
and large investments in infrastructure. Otherwise a certain stability
could only be guaranteed by a large and steady flow of foreign aid.
The United States doesn't seem to be ready to guarantee such a flow.
Consequently the countries of the region will solve their problems
furtheron by exporting part of the labor force to the U.S. and by
keeping the majority of population in poverty and dependence. The
results of CBI will be a strengthening of the modern private sector in
Caribbean and Central American countries and a stronger alignment of
their foreign trade flows with the United States.
Since the 1950s U.S. dominance of foreign trade linkages of Latin
American countries declined steadily. In 1950 Latin America sent
almost half of its exports to the United States, in 1980 the U.S. share
was only 34 percent. The corresponding figures for the Latin American
imports are: 50 percent in 1950 and 30 percent in 1980. U.S. domi-
nance declined as Latin American countries began to trade more equally
with the other major economic powers of the world, especially with Western
Europe and Japan. This diversification of economic linkages offered
Latin America a number of economic and political advantages:
- less dependence on one huge market and its cycles;
- more favorable conditions through competition between several
economic powers;
- less frictions because of the geographical distance;
pursuit of mutual interests in the relations with other middle
powers;
offer of a plurality of concepts of political and economic develop-
ment.
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There are several reasons to expect that as a result of the Reagan
Administration's policy the dependence of Latin American countries in
their trade relations on the powerful neighbor in the North will grow
again:
The U.S. economy is currently booming, whereas the European countries
haven't yet recovered from the recession. The Japanese market re-
mains strongly protected.
The high foreign debts in Dollars forces the Latin American coun-
tries to earn hard currencies.
The depreciation of Latin American currencies spurs export to the
United States.
The CBI program will align Central American and Caribbean trade
relations with the United States even more strongly.
The high and growing number of aliens in the United States origi-
nating from Latin American countries will lead in the long run to
increased export into the region (because of the transfer of consumer
patterns)
.
The available figures confirm these reflections. Although exports from
Latin countries fell $10 billion in 1982 due to the recession of their
major trading partners, U.S. imports from Latin America remained steady.
1 O
The U.S. share of Latin exports therefore rose to 40 percent in 1982.
A further rise of the share will have occurred since then. In 1984
alone exports to the United States rose 20 percent. The situation is,
of course, different on the import side. The debt-servicing problems
have forced the Latin American countries to severe and steady reduc-
tions of their merchandise imports. In 1982 Latin imports fell 20 per-
cent, in 1983 another 13 percent. Because U.S. exports to Latin America
-15-
fell at similar rates, U.S. share of Latin imports remained nearly
unchanged.
Policy on Private Foreign Investments
and U.S. Investments in Latin America
In the same way the Reagan Administration favors the private sector
for its dynamism and efficiency in the domestic policy, it is advocat-
ing the virtues of market mechanism in developing countries. It sees
constant government interventions and size of the state sector as the
main reasons for the current crisis in the Third World. Consequently,
it is very skeptical of concessional government-to-government help and
prefers direct foreign investment as most effective medium for the
transfer of capital and technology to developing countries. To attract
a sufficient amount of foreign investments the host countries are ad-
vised to establish a stable business climate and adopt an export-led
strategy. Thus far, the responsibility for an increased flow of private
investment capital has been left predominantly with the developing coun-
tries themselves.
This attitude is reflected in the Administration's own behavior.
»
There have been no major changes in U.S. policy toward the activities
of U.S. firms abroad or new initiatives for stimulating investments
19(perhaps with the exception of CBI). The Administration reaffirmed
the traditional position that foreign investors should be treated in
the same way as domestic enterprises. And the old demand was reiterated
that expropriations of investors' property should be accompanied by
prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
The Administration's efforts were concentrated on an expansion of
existing institutions and programs, whose effects on Latin America have
-16-
been small, however. One of those institutions is the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U.S. government agency that stimulates
investments in developing countries by insuring firms against certain
political risks. Although the lessening of restrictions resulted in
an FY1983 tripling of total insured investment, Latin America and the
20Caribbean accounted for under 4 percent of the total. One of the
reasons is the Calvo doctrine, which prevents many Latin American coun-
tries from agreeing to the OPIC requirement of an international arbitration
in the event of investor dispute. A second institution which is devoted
to stimulate private investments in developing countries is the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC), an affiliate of the World Bank. Its
task is to make equity investments and provide loans to private firms
in developing countries. The Administration favors a proposal to give
the IFC a $750 million capital injection. But as a result of the deep
recession and the decline in investment, IFC activities in Latin America
remain small ($214 million in FY1983). 21
The only activity of the Reagan Administration in the field of
direct investment directed specifically to Latin America has been the
CBI. Originally the Administration envisaged an investment tax credit
of 10 percent for U.S. business investing in the Caribbean Basin. The
Congress, however, rejected the proposal. But, as outlined before, the
FTA could provide strong incentives for future investments in Central
America and the Caribbean. Moreover, the government currently makes
strong efforts to promote its initiative and to encourage private in-
vestments in the Caribbean Basin. An inter-agency task force as well
as several task force subcommittees have been formed to serve those
purposes. The Commerce Department has established a Caribbean Basin
-17-
Information Center that not only informs U.S. businessmen of export
opportunities, but also promotes imports and investments. In addition,
special task, forces have been established at each U.S. embassy in the
Basin, which seek to stimulate interest in trade and joint ventures.
Today the bulk of U.S. direct investments is located in the deve-
22
loped countries (1980:73 percent). U.S. investments in developing
countries, however, are heavily concentrated in Latin America (1980:72
percent). Expressed in absolute figures, U.S. direct investment posi-
tion in Latin America amounted in the same year to $38.8 billion. The
largest single recipients are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela,
which account together for nearly 47 percent of U.S. investments in
Latin America. The magnitude of those direct investments furtheron
guarantees to U.S. enterprises a major role in the Latin American eco-
nomy, although a certain decline in U.S. superiority since the 60s has
to be noted. In 1965 the U.S. share of direct foreign investments in
23
Latin America was about 70-75 percent, while estimates for 1980 indi-
cate a drop of the U.S. share to about 60 percent. It must be con-
sidered, however, that the remaining 40 percent have to be divided up
between several other nations, of which the most important are West
Germany, Great Britain and Japan.
Of course, the situation in each Latin American country is dif-
ferent. In Brazil, for example, the U.S. share is lower than the Latin
American average; in neighboring Mexico it lies over the average. In
Costa Rica it even reaches 80 percent. These figures, however, don't
paint the full picture of the role of foreign enterprises, mainly U.S.
-18-
enterprise, in Che Latin American economies. Foreign direct invest-
ments are concentrated in a few dynamic branches like the chemical,
electrical and automobile industry, the petroleum sector, machinery and
banking. These branches are often monopolized by foreign enterprises,
the access of national firms to modern techniques of production and
marketing is limited. A large portion of Latin American exports of
manufactured products originates from foreign firms, which at the same
time depend heavily on imports, mostly from their home country.
Remittances of profits and royalties are another burden in the current
account. Finally, important decision-making power is transferred to
institutions whose first loyalty lies with their home offices.
U.S. direct investment position in Latin America declined to $32.5
24billion in 1982 and $29.5 billion in 1983. This decline can be traced
back, however, nearly exclusively to borrowing by U.S. parents from their
Netherland Antilles finance affiliates; such borrowing gives rise to
capital inflows which reduce the balance of payments deficit. In the
manufacturing sector there was only a slight reduction, while invest-
ments in the petroleum sector and banking expanded. Anyhow, the role
of U.S. enterprises in the Latin American economy is not determined by
the greatly varying annual flows, but by the accumulated stock of
investments. For the near future a new increase of U.S. investments in
Latin America can be expected. One reason for this prediction is the
fact that the CBI program offers a variety of new possibilities for U.S.
investors in Central America and the Caribbean. Secondly, under pres-
sure from the IMF and the United States many Latin American countries
-19-
had in recent years to adopt more liberal and export-oriented policies,
which make those countries anew attractive for foreign investments.
Financial Policies and Debt Crisis
The debt crisis not only darkens the economic prospects of Latin
American countries but also overshadows the totality of their foreign
economic relations. Because of the crucial role of U.S. banks and the
heavy U.S. influence in the IMF it is the clearest expression of the
new dependency. In the 1970s private bank lending became the principal
mean of moving funds from the wealthy to the developing world, replacing
direct investments. In every year since 1971 credits from the private
25
banking system exceeded direct investments.
What conditions have led to the rise of bank lending? After the
first oil price shock, the oil-importing developing countries were
confronted with energy price hikes, global inflation and slow growth in
exports to the industrial countries. Especially the NICs, among them
many Latin American countries, which relied in their growth strategy
heavily on energy and industrial imports and on manufacturing exports,
experienced growing trade and current-account deficits. Consequently
these countries looked for financial sources to cover the deficits.
At the same time, the banking system disposed of enough liquid means
originating from deposits made by OPEC countries and multinationals.
Because demand for loans was sluggish in the stagnant industrial coun-
tries, the commercial banks were willing to make loans to governmental
agencies and private firms in countries they once ranked as risky
clients.
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Latin America, with its higher level of per capita income and
improving prospects at the beginning of the 1970s, was particularly
attractive to private capital. The unprecedented influx of capital
enabled the oil-importing countries of the region to continue their
growth-led policies and to avoid painful austerity measures. Between
1973 and 1980 the public debt of Latin American countries rose from
26$27 billion to $123 billion, of which a great part is owed to U.S. banks.
As mentioned before, the Reagan Administration entered with highly
favorable attitudes toward the free flow of capital across borders and
considered commercial bank lending as a welcome substitute for con-
cessional government-to-government aid which it wanted to restrict to
the neediest countries. At the same time, the Administration made it
clear that it would use all of its influence to induce the IMF* to return
to its traditional role and serve primarily as a provider of short-term
27
finance to assist countries facing immediate foreign exchange shortages.
This commitment was especially directed at new IMF facilities which in-
cluded structural measures and allowed a more gradual approach to adjust-
ment. The Administration didn't want a blurring of the division of
responsibility for short-term adjustment—the proper role of the IMF
—
and longer term development. Likewise the Reagan Administration was
initially opposed to an increase of IMF resources because it feared a
large quota increase would result in less rigorous conditionality and
an undesirable expansion of global liquidity and inflation.
*The United States is the biggest contributor.
-21-
The Reagan Administration was reluctant to recognize the severity
of the debt crisis. As a result of the second oil-price shock and
worldwide rising interest rates, the foreign debt of developing countries
had even grown faster. At the end of 1982 the total debt of Latin
American countries had reached around $250 billion, of which U.S. banks
28
hold about 40 percent. Brazil and Mexico had become the major debtors
29
among developing countries. In addition, Argentina, Venezuela and
Chile ranked with the 13 highest debtors among developing countries.
Finally, the crisis over Mexico and Poland as well as rising prob-
lems in Brazil and Argentina forced the Reagan Administration to depart
—
at least gradually—from its previous conservative strategy toward the
Third World debt. When Mexico in August 1982 suspended payments on its
foreign debts, the whole international financial system and, of course,
the creditor banks seemed in great danger. This time, driven by
security concerns in the economic sphere, the Administration made the
following policy departures:
- It now agreed to a substantial increase in IMF resources.
- Whereas swap arrangements had been previously reserved for industrial
countries, U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve were prepared to
extend such "bridge financing" to countries like Mexico, Brazil and
31
Argentina.
The U.S. government, acting primarily through the Federal Reserve,
became an accomplice of the IMF as this institution conditioned
its own lending on commercial banks extending new net loans to
debtor nations.
-22-
The U.S. government, the IMF and the commercial banks are today
cooperating closely to keep financial markets functioning. Having been
traditionally reserved for exceptional emergencies, rescheduling of
debt—whether owed to official or private creditors—became in the mean-
time a matter of routine. In the case of Latin American countries, U.S.
banks, as the most important creditors, are usually heading the negotia-
tions on rescheduling and new credits.
Since 1982 10 Latin American countries had to approach the IMF,
among them all Newly Industrialized Countries of the sub-continent:
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Uruguay,
32
Brazil and Mexico. As 'lender of last resort ' and international
monetary authority the IMF ties its help with heavy policy strings.
It constantly monitors whether a borrowing nation observes those con-
ditions .
As mentioned before, the U.S. government exerted all its influence
to reduce the IMF's responsibility to only short-term adjustments in
the overdebted countries. The aim of the measures negotiated by the Fund
and the borrowing nation is to produce during a period of two to three
years a surplus in the trade balance, which enables the country to pay
back its debts. Typically, the Fund requires reductions In government
spending and subsidies, slower growth of the money supply, devaluation
of the currency and restraints on wage increases. By these measures
the IMF intends to restrict demand and to slow down the economy. As a
consequence, it is expected that imports will decrease and exports
increase. In many ways the IMF's policy resembles the Reagan
Administration's philosophy on how to overcome the current crisis in
-23-
many developing countries. One could even go so far as to state that
the Administration's ideas about the Third World are implemented by the
IMF in cooperation with some other multilateral organizations.
In 1983 and 1984 Mexico and Brazil have been quite successful in
producing a surplus in the trade balance and the balance of current
account, although the surplus never reached the dimensions necessary to
start paying back the accumulated debts. But for this success many
33
sacrifices had to be made. The gross domestic product fell sharply,
industrial production declined even more sharply, inflation went up
further and unemployment showed new record highs. But most frustrating
is that in spite of all efforts the foreign debt of Latin American
countries is rising further. The region's debt is estimated to stand
currently at $350 billion. This indicates that the debt problem will
stay on the agenda and keep Latin American countries for quite a number
of years dependent upon foreign banks and the IMF. How long is indi-
cated by an accord between Mexico and its foreign-bank creditors, which
34
allows the repayment of that country's debt over a period of 14 years.
Foreign Aid Policy and Aid Flows to Latin America
The foreign aid policy perfectly reflects the major guidelines used
by the Reagan Administration in the formulation of its international
policies: Primarily, foreign aid, which comprises military and economic
assistance is seen as just another tool which has to serve the govern-
ment's short-term strategic and political gaols abroad. Because of
the provision of greater diplomatic leverage bilateral is favored
over multilateral aid. Bilateral aid is restricted to countries which
-24-
show a friendly attitude toward the United States and its free market
economy. Not surprisingly, the bilateral aid flows are highly concen-
trated to countries which are of special interest in the Administration's
35political and security concept (e.g. Israel, Egypt and El Salvador).
Within bilateral aid military assistance and security-related aid (the
Economic Support Fund) is accented compared to development assistance.
The Reagan Administration's standpoint on development assistance
strongly reflects its opinion on domestic social welfare programs.
Administration officials hold government-to-government aid as inherently
inefficient, because it diminishes the capacity of the recipient nation
to engage in self-help activities. Moreover, in most cases development
assistance further enlarges the state sector's influence in the economy
at the expenses of the private sector. Therefore, the Administration
feels that development aid cannot be effective unless recipient coun-
tries first adjust their domestic economic structures to give adequate
scope to market mechanisms and incentives to the private sector. To
ensure such an environment the Administration favors combining nego-
tiations on development projects with a dialogue about the economic
policy of the host-country. Finally, the Administration seems deter-
mined to turn the Agency for International Development (AID) into an
36
instrument to promote the private sector. New programs have been
announced which will, e.g.
,
provide assistance to agro-industry, finance
privately owned development finance companies which lend to private
firms, encourage the growth of capital markets, and allow AID Itself to
make investments in private firms.
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When Reagan carae to office, he cut development assistance by 26
percent compared with the last budget under the responsibility of former
President Carter. In 1981, the United States gave $5.8 billion as
official development aid and had, except for Italy, the lowest ODA-GNP
ratio among the seventeen members of the OECD's Development Assistance
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Committee. The U.S. figure of 0.20 percent has to be contrasted with
an average of 0.46 percent for other DAC members and the international
target of 0.7 percent. Because the development aid budget was kept
virtually unchanged during the last years, the ODA-GNP ratio will have
fallen even further behind the DAC average. These figures clearly
express the Administration's neglect of the economic and social problems
of the Third World and the development pattern of those countries.
74.7 percent of the 1981 ODA was disbursed bilaterally compared
with 61.2 percent in 1980. This means in absolute terms that bilateral
ODA stayed nearly untouched, whereas contributions to multilateral
institutions were cut sharply. The bilateral approach of the Reagan
Administration is further underlined by the build-up of the security-
related Economic Support Fund (ESF). The Fund is also open to countries
which do not meet criteria for development assistance and is therefore
a flexible instrument in the hands of the Administration. ESF assis-
tance is often used to support a country's balance of payments. In FY
1982 the U.S. budget for bilateral economic aid allocated 41 percent of
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the total to the ESF and 59 percent to development assistance. This
compared with percentages of 22 and 78 nine years earlier.
Latin America receives only a relatively small portion of the bi-
lateral economic aid. In 1981 the countries of the region received
-26-
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S588 million, which equals 8 percent of the total budget. The main
reason is that all larger Latin American countries, viewed as rela-
tively advanced, are excluded from concessional assistance as provided
40
by the AID (following a decision of former President Carter). These
countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay
and Venezuela. Consequently, bilateral aid flows are concentrated on
countries in Central America and the Caribbean. E.g.
,
in 1981 El
Salvador, which plays a crucial role in the Administration's counter
strategy, ranked seventh (after Egypt, Israel, India, Turkey,
Bangladesh and Indonesia) under the major recipients of U.S. economic
assistance. Peru ranked tenth in the same year and Jamaica twelfth.
In 1983 economic assistance to Latin America increased considerably
41because of an additional $350 million which was part of the CBI package.
$299 million was allocated for balance-of-payment support. The main
beneficiaries were El Salvador and Costa Rica with $75 million each.
Though the $350 million was only a one-year appropriation it can be
expected that economic assistance will stay on a higher level than in
the years 1981 and 1982 because of the strategical importance of the
Caribbean Basin to the Reagan Administration.
In its approach to foreign aid the Reagan Administration is least
enthusiastic about multilateral programs, especially highly concessional
ones. It accuses the multilateral institutions of fostering socialism
in the Third World and promoting income redistribution. Moreover, they
didn't serve adequately U.S. interests taking into account the high
contributions of the United States. Consequently the Administration an-
nounced that it would seek a major reduction of roughly 30 - 45 percent
-27-
in U.S. contributions to the "soft loan" windows of the multilateral
development banks (mdbs), primarily the International Development
42
Association (IDA) of the World Bank. At the same time it expressed
support for continued expansion of the hard-loan World Bank windows,
which require less donor government financing, but at reduced growth
rates. In addition, the Administration recommended that the mdbs should
condition their loans closer to sound—that is, private-sector, market-
oriented
—
policies at the macro-economic level.
Because IDA-loans are restricted to poorer developing countries
(under a per capita income of $500) the sharp reduction in the IDA
lending level following the Administration's decision to lower U.S.
contributions didn't hit Latin American countries very hard. A dif-
ferent story, of course, is the reduction of the Inter-American Bank
concessional lendings. In 1983 the U.S. government succeeded in lower-
ing the annual lending levels for the Fund for Special Operations from
$786 million in 1982 to an average of $500 million during the four-year
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replenishment period. The more favorable attitude toward hard loans
was demonstrated when the Administration approved a $15 billion increase
in the authorized capital stock for the World Bank's conventional lend-
ing program. This will allow hard loans to rise in volume from $1.9
billion in 1982 to $3.45 billion in 1986. Latin American countries
will benefit from this increase. Nevertheless, four Latin American
countries, which are among the major World Bank borrowers, are follow-
ing a recommendation of the Reagan Administration under the threat of
44
being graduated from IBRD lending.
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So far, the picture is very complex. It seems that economic assis-
tance to Latin American countries derived from U.S. and multilateral
sources remained quite unchanged under the Reagan Administration, but
is even more concentrated toward the Caribbean Basin. This clearly
reflects the strategic object the Administration pursues with the
foreign aid instrument. Most South American countries don't receive
any assistance on favorable terms, although sharp imbalances exist in
those societies, too. Moreover, some countries are threatened with
being phased out from World Bank, lending which would leave them totally
dependent on the private capital market. Another questionable develop-
ment is the growing conditional! ty of foreign aid on the initiative of
the Reagan Administration. It urges the recipient countries to adopt
an economic philosophy which is not necessarily suitable to their own
environment.
Conclusions
The United States at present is politically and economically in a
strong position. This consequently enables the Reagan Administration
to carry out its economic policy toward Latin America, which appears to
be determined as well by geopolitical interests as by a strong belief
in the advantages of a free-market economy. In addition, international
circumstances have been favorable for the Reagan Administration quest
to restore U.S. superiority in the Americas. There are several indica-
tions for a new dependency of Latin American countries on the predom-
inant U.S. economy as a result of the Reagan Administration's policy.
The strongest are:
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The U.S. share of Latin exports rose considerably.
The CBI will reorientate Caribbean trade flows even stronger toward
the United States.
The Latin American countries are highly indebted to U.S. banks and
„." in desperate need of new loans.
- The U.S. government itself is heavily involved in the management of
the debt crisis, e.g. by extending "bridge financing" and by enforcing
stricter rules upon IMF lendings.
The Reagan Administration is using bilateral aid as a leverage for
its geopolitical and economic goals.
The debt crisis together with the economic policy of the Reagan
Administration has forced Latin American countries into a painful
adjustment process. They have had to accept lower living standards,
they are experiencing high unemployment rates and they are faced with a
new upsurge of inflation rates. Moreover, they are under constant
pressure to expose themselves fully to the international competition
and to continue with the liberalization of their economies. This would
mean a complete departure from the long-term pattern of economic policy
in Latin America.
The international environment will remain unfavorable for Latin
American countries. A change of U.S. foreign policy is not in sight.
Reagan was reelected in 1984. His policy will therefore have a strong
impact on interamerican relations for nearly the rest of the decade.
An increase of development aid for Latin America is not on the agenda
of the reinstated Administration, perhaps with the exception of some
troubled countries in the Caribbean. The private banks will remain
-30-
reluctant to provide fresh credits to Latin American countries. Also
the flow of direct investments will only pick up slowly.
This situation is a challenge and an opportunity at the same time.
The Latin American countries cannot any longer look for external solu-
tions to their problems. They can stabilize themselves only by carrying
out a number of long delayed internal reforms, e.g. reforms in the
neglected agrarian sector, promotion of small and middle-sized enter-
prises, improvement of the national education system and broadening of
the technological basis. The foundation for such a policy change has
been laid. In recent years, many Latin American countries turned away
from authoritarian regimes and returned to democracy. It is now up to
the new leaders to prove their commitment to a more equal social and
economic development of their countries.
D/286
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Table 1
Distribution of Latin American Trade Flows, 1950-1982 (Percentages)
Exports
Imports
U.S. L.A. E.E.C. Japan
1950 48.3 9.3a 27.
8
a —
1960 39.5 16.5 — 2.6
1970 32.9 17.1 25.7 5.5
1978 34.1 — — —
1979 34.4 21.9 18.7 3.9
1980 34.0 — — —
1982 ~ 40.0 — — —
1950 50.1 10.
9
a 14.
5
a —
1960 38.5 16.7 — 3.2
1970 34.8 16.3 23.9 6.0
1978 28.7 — — —
1979 28.2 19.0 17.6 6.4
1980 30.4 — — —
1982 ~ 30.0 — — —
a 1948
Source: Pan American Union, IMF, UNCTAD
Table 2
Share of the Latin American Region in U.S. Trade 1978-1982
(Percentages)
Imports
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
South America 9.3 10.5 11.0 11.0 12.1
Central America 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6
Caribbean 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.5
Mexico 3.
A
4.1 5.1 5.2 6.2
Venezuela 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0
Brazil 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8
Exports
South America 12.2 13.0 14.7 15.2 12.6
Central America 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6
Caribbean 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9
Mexico 4.6 5.4 6.9 7.7 5.6
Venezuela 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4
Brazil 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
Vol. I, New York, 1984, p. 1049.
Table 3
U.S. Direct Investment Position in Latin America, 1966-1983
(millions of dollars)
1966 1977 1981 1982 1983
Total 9.752 27.514 38.838 32.546 29.501
Argentina 758 1.262 2.757 3.002 3.054
Brazil 882 5.695 8.247 8.995 9.022
Mexico 1.329 3.201 6.979 5.544 4.999
Netherlands Antilles — -792 -7.143 -15.885 -19.722
Panama — 2.442 3.785 4.396 4.519
Peru — 1.160 1.926 2.266 2.316
Venezuela 2.136 1.560 2.252 2.328 1.641
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce
Table 4
Latin American Foreign Debt, 1980-1984
(billions of dollars)
Total
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Pern
Venezuela
Short-term debt not included
Short-term debt included
Share
of U.S.
end of end of end of end of Banks in
1980a 1981 b 1982b 1984 1982
123.0 — 250.0 350.0
12.2 35.6 43.0 45.0 35%
51.5 61.4 87.0 98.0 37%
5.1 12.6 17.2 20.0 52%
6.7 8.5 10.3 13.0 55%
39.0 73.0 80.1 93.0 39%
8.4 8.8 11.5 13.0 44%
11.1 26.0 29.5 35.0 37%
Source: M. Daly Hayes, Latin America and the U.S. National Interest,
Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984; Inter-American
Development Bank; IMF; various issues of the New York Times.
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